The unification of the military is what politicians fear, as the patriotism of the military does not fit with the corruption of the ruling elite, but the trump card in the hands of the army is that it enjoys popular support, external respect and an honorable historical legacy.
When the chief of staff of the Libyan National Army, Abdul Raziq Al-Nadouri, landed at Mitiga airport, there was a general feeling that the professional military hierarchy, the sons of the ancient school, which represents one of the most prominent foundations of Libyan patriotism, are the best able to overcome differences, turn the page on conflicts, abandon grudges and embrace the trend towards enshrining the concept of national reconciliation, which seems to be unpalatable and uncomfortable to other parties.
Nazouri’s visit to Tripoli to attend the meeting of the Joint Military Committee was rich in meetings and contacts that took place in absolute secrecy, and witnessed the raising of many important issues for the future of the exhausted country, during which it agreed on decisions that will appear successively, especially with regard to security and military coordination in the areas of contact, the release of new batches of detainees and prisoners, the coordination of counter-terrorism efforts, administrative coordination, the exchange of information, services and visits, and the development of the project of unifying the military institution at the forefront of the goals proposed during the next phase, which will be a practical and realistic starting point for national reconciliation.
Al-Nadhouri would not have arrived in Tripoli and received that welcome had it not been for the presence of political coordination at the highest level and a decision by Abdul Hamid al-Dabaiba, the Minister of Defense of his outgoing government and the main financier of the militias controlling the ground, and the emergence of signs of consensus between Al-Dabaiba and the leadership of the National Army on a number of files, the most prominent of which during the past days was the energy file, which witnessed the overthrow of the head of the National Oil Corporation Mustafa Sanalla and the appointment of Farhat bin Qadara, followed by the lifting of force majeure on production and export sites, including those that have been inoperative since mid-April, mostly in the sphere of influence of the military led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.
There is no doubt that Dabaiba is well aware that the army leadership is holding the reins in its areas of influence, has influential relations at home and abroad, and is able to move its mechanisms to impose its choices, and cannot be bypassed, aided or challenged by childish methods such as those he adopted during the past year, through which he sought to win the loyalties of militias, warlords, political Islam and radical revolutionaries at the expense of the main task assigned to his government, which is to unite the national ranks and get out of the tunnel of rupture and division.
When we talk about the state of government division, the new government emanating from the House of Representatives, which begins its work from the city of Sirte, would not have been formed and would not have the confidence of the parliament and would not be active in the east and south of the country, if not for the direct support it received from the army, which came as a result of the ability of its president Fathi Bashaga and his commander-in-chief Khalifa Haftar to build bridges of trust after the fierce war in which they were parties, according to their respective locations, and its physical and psychological barriers were overcome after the historic handshake between the two strong men in Benghazi on December 21 last year, when they decided to end the conflict between them and look for a way out of the crisis in light of the announcement of the failure of all efforts made to organize elections on December 24, 2021.
A few months ago, Al-Dabaiba was not enthusiastic about the role of the Joint Military Committee, nor was he able to communicate with the army leadership, and he went so far as to order not to pay the salaries of Field Marshal Haftar’s forces for several months, which forced direct intervention from external parties, foremost Washington, to solve the problem, and this disagreement led to a state of total rupture that was only broken during the past weeks with the mediation of the United Arab Emirates, on several levels on a number of fronts.
Since the agreement between the delegations of the government of National Accord and the Army participating in the 5+5 Joint Military Committee in October 2020, the Libyan military has been seeking to bridge the gap that politicians and warlords were establishing to divide society into teams, sects, militias and gangs in the framework of a struggle for power and wealth that relied on direct empowerment by external parties that have not concealed their ambitions for control of the country and.
The military has succeeded in reaching a ceasefire decision between the parties to the conflict in the west and east of the country, and in setting a number of priorities to normalize the situation and reopen bridges between the people of the same geography, and through their efforts many goals were achieved that seemed impossible in 2019 when the role of politicians in general was closer to systematic sabotage, the struggle for booty, which began after the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and produced a political elite that has no goal except to serve personal and family interests under factional and ideological banners – tribal, regional, partisan – and to achieve it and maintain it through alliances with warlords, corrupt tycoons, thieves of public money and human traffickers.
So far, there are no politicians in the Libyan decision-making centers who are not involved in perpetuating the conflict and obstructing the political solution, including the House of Representatives, the state, and the Dabaiba government, while the military shows a clear desire to turn the page on the conflict through clear mechanisms, most notably restoring the state’s sovereignty by unifying their long-standing institution, dissolving militias, collecting weapons, evacuating foreign forces and mercenaries, achieving reconciliation, and organizing elections in a pluralistic democratic context that accommodates everyone, since any exclusion of any party will directly continue the conflict.
But there are those who reject this trend, especially the leaders of militias and armed groups that control the capital Tripoli and all the cities of the West Coast, who consider themselves guardians of the state and the February Revolution, and they enjoy the privileges of the crisis, including looting public money, impunity and direct interference in the management of governance, and Tripoli is completely under the control of armed groups. And Dabaiba benefits from his attempt to temporarily break through the ranks by relying on the carrot without the stick within the framework of balances that he uses to maintain his power under flimsy slogans, which is so no different from the other actors in the general political scene.
The visit of the Chief of Staff of the western region, Mohammed Al-Haddad, to Benghazi in the coming days will have a great impact, especially if he meets with Field Marshal Haftar in front of television cameras, and not behind a blackout, as happened to the meetings of Nazouri in Tripoli. But that is not enough. The efforts of the military institution, despite its seriousness and importance, suffer from the obstacles placed in front of it by politicians who are still benefiting from the state of its division. The commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, the head of the Presidential Council, Mohammed Al-Manfi, has not yet found enough courage to meet with Haftar, or to visit the army headquarters in the eastern province, for example, and the minister of defense in the government that is supposed to be the government of national unity, Abdul Hamid al-Dabaiba, has not initiated any positive public movement in the direction of the military institution and its general leadership in Rajma.
The truth is that the unification of the military institution is what politicians fear, the patriotism of the military does not fit with the corruption of the ruling elite, but the trump card in the hands of the army is that it enjoys great popular support, external respect, an honorable historical legacy and a recognized national role, and that it is able to assemble its ranks under one command that can be at any point of Libyan soil, provided that it goes beyond the calculations of individual or factional interests for the benefit of the public good, and if there is a need for a field confrontation, the army must fight it united against militias, terrorists, mercenaries, thieves and those who have betrayed all Libyans.
When Al-Nadhouri landed at Mitiga airport in Tripoli, the Libyan military achieved an important step on the way to uniting its ranks, but that military remains a considered quality that can only be translated on the ground by the determination of men who will have to take further steps towards forming an army capable of bringing about real change on the ground by discipline contrary to the chaotic situation, and by sacrificing for the homeland in the face of those who sacrifice the homeland to serve their goals and the goals of those behind them.
Translation by Internationalist 360°
INTERNATIONALIST 360° 