Lautaro Rivara and Héctor Béjar
Presidential hopeful for Peru Libre, Pedro Castillo, had a bumpy ride on a mare while going to his polling station in Cajamarca.
With more than 60 years of leading experience in Peruvian politics, Héctor Béjar breaks down in this exclusive interview the context and motives of the coup, and presents a panoramic view of a country caught between reality and fiction.
The rearing horse that “professor” Pedro Castillo, then candidate for the presidency, rode in Tacabamba, became neither a metaphor for speed nor bravery. With a slow stride and a confused step, his government chose, from the very first moment, the strategy of retreat. One step back and then another. Restraint in order to contain. Offering a program for governability to a seditious and insatiable opposition. The most unexpected government of the so-called “second progressive wave” lasted barely fifteen months.
However, it must be recognized that the conditions for the exercise of his government could not have been more hostile, since his narrow victory over Keiko Fujimori by barely 44 thousand votes in the second round of the elections. The president himself quickly became a non-party, disaffected by his own will or abandoned by some of his own, while the friendly fire between “sectarians” and “caviars” ended up with the fracture of the parliamentary blocs. In addition, a very high turnover of civil servants and several scandals and denunciations turned many ministers into lightning rods, discontinuing all executive policies. We can also add the adverse economic conditions generated by the war in Ukraine, and even the protests in the regions by sectors of the transport workers and other subjects that would a priori make up its natural social base.
To this must be added the sapping work of the Congress: from the parliamentary blockade to the proposals for health and education reforms, to the vacancy motions and the accusations of alleged treason against Castillo. In short, his government raised many hopes, many difficulties and many fears, with the vivid memory of the disappointment caused by the presidency of Ollanta Humala, who promised, and failed to deliver, to be a sort of a Creole Hugo Chavez.
We had a conversation with Héctor Béjar Rivera regarding his evaluation of a government of which he was part for a very brief period, serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Béjar’s political experience has been anything but brief. For 60 years he played a leading role in Peruvian politics, from the political-military path he explored in the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) and the Peruvian National Liberation Army, to his institutional participation in the Velasco Alvarado government and its agrarian reform policy, as well as in the Constituent Assembly of 1978. His intellectual life has been equally profuse, from the creation of the Center for Development and Participation (CEDEP), to the publication of numerous articles, essays and books, some of them true classics of Peruvian history and sociology. We refer to his vast experience in this conversation.
Héctor Béjar Rivera during his inauguration as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru.
Everything seemed to indicate that the constituent reform was a demand with broad popular support. Why was that flag lowered as soon as Castillo entered the palace?
It is true that a constituent reform was proposed, and the mobilizations continue to propose it. I have always said that we should not speak of a constituent assembly but of a constituent process, because under the present conditions, an assembly would replicate the parliament. We even run the risk that a body hastily formed in this situation of political precariousness that Peru is going through could be even worse than the Congress itself, giving rise to a Constitution even more regressive than that of 1993, created by the dictatorship of Alberto Fujimori.
What we need to do then is undertake a constituent process, a work of education and dissemination with the rural and urban communities, from the grassroots. And, based on the intense popular struggles that are taking place in Peru -which have now intensified-, we must start to create a Constitution that is not the fruit of dubious people or of mafia instruments.
And what about the agrarian reform that the former president announced with great fanfare?
The agrarian reform never existed. It was nothing more than a publicity tool. There were even those who wanted to compare it with the one carried out by Velasco Alvarado, but that was ridiculous.
Why did some of your statements generate such a level of virulence in the opposition? How was it that your resignation as Minister was precipitated?
In Peru there are no right-wingers: there are mafias. This group of mafias and some political parties raised a real outcry of rage when I was appointed Chancellor, so they were looking for any pretext to force my departure. They used as an excuse two statements I had made long before. I stated two things: that the first terrorist acts in Peru were committed by the Navy in 1974, and that the army was involved in some acts of [the guerrilla group] Sendero [Shining Path]. According to them this was an insult to the armed forces. They threatened a coup and the government, which at that time was only 19 days old, trembled.
But it is the Navy itself that acknowledged this, and published a book in homage to those within the institution who carried out these acts of terrorism against General Velasco. One can, moreover, ascertain these facts just by reading the newspapers of that time. This was in 1974, long before the birth of Sendero, which operated from 1980 to 1992. During those twelve years, were the Army intelligence services not capable of penetrating the organization? Were they so inefficient? It is obvious that to penetrate a terrorist organization you have to practice terrorism: those are its rules. This can be understood by anyone, you don’t need to be a scholar or an expert.
As a result of pressure from the armed forces, I was prevented from going to Congress. Castillo and his closest circle probably thought that this could aggravate the situation. If my presence endangered the government, the best thing to do was to get me out of the way. And that is what I did with my resignation.
The deep sewers
The last few years of Peruvian politics seem to have made one thing clear: the political structure is rotten. Six presidents in seven years, the dramatic suicide of a former president, a judiciary that is like the dog in the manger: it neither governs nor lets govern. An omnipresent past that went from democracy to de facto government and then recycled again under a precarious rule of law: Fujimorism, a monster with multiple heads and parties that has been determining the pulse of the last 30 years of local politics. A Constitution, of unholy origin, that protects and shields that which really matters: the apparently untouchable neoliberal economic model. These are some of the deep sewers that furrow the Peruvian State.
For weeks now, absolutely contrasting analyses of the country’s political system have been circulating. The right wing affirms that Peru demonstrates the failure of presidentialism in Latin America, while other sectors affirm that Peru evidences the chronic problems of a parliament with powers and prerogatives inconceivable in other formally presidential countries. What is your analysis of this tense power relationship between the executive and the legislature, and what kind of political reform do you imagine could solve this fundamental problem?
What happened is that the 1993 Constitution is a terrible result of a disastrous coup d’état and of an entangled negotiation of Mr. Fujimori – de facto president at that time – with the OAS and the international community. This resulted in a legal text full of patches, which has elements of Fujimori’s de facto presidentialism, who wanted -and finally succeeded- to perpetuate his power.
But on the other hand, international pressure introduced some interesting elements, such as the Ombudsman’s Office, habeas data, the Court of Constitutional Guarantees -now the Constitutional Court-, etcetera. But at this point it is clear that this Constitution is useless. It also has a famous economic chapter that shields and makes invulnerable foreign investment, exonerated from taxes in Peru. It is an apparatus that no longer works. The discussion on human rights, for example, has advanced a great deal since 1993 to date: there are human rights that have been incorporated into other legislations in Latin America and in the world that simply do not exist in Peru.
All this is what has to be explained, what has to be worked with the popular bases of the country. What is happening is that this Constitution, already patched in 1993, has been further patched. And it was this Congress, which supposedly refused to touch the Magna Carta, which has made more than thirty modifications that Peruvians do not even know about. Some of these modifications annulled existing rights, such as the right to referendum.
And what about the judicialization of politics? Already in the last elections, 10 of the 18 presidential candidates had judicial processes in progress. Is what we see in Peru a local singularity or can it be considered a national chapter of a regional strategy of lawfare application?
There are both. After the Velasco government, the Peruvian armed forces were denationalized and lost quality: their training is no longer what it used to be, not only from the strictly military point of view, but also from their national and general culture. Corruption was introduced in the Army and also in the police. However, they know that they cannot directly carry out a coup d’état: there is no propitious environment either in Latin America or in the world for that. But as everybody knows, the modalities of coups have been varying. Today in Peru we have a “PM”, a media party, very active as well as monopolistic and concentrated. A “PF”, the prosecution party. And a “PJ”, the party of the judiciary. These three parties, together with the Congress, are the four great actors that govern Peru, having behind them the great local and foreign capitals.
“The armed forces] know that they cannot directly stage a coup d’état: there is no favorable environment either in Latin America or in the world for that.”
That web of power has resulted in Castillo being harassed, stigmatized, prosecuted, accused of five thousand things, since before he was president, which does not mean that Castillo is a neat, pure, popular leader, or anything that resembles that. Castillo is for me a character that would require a much more detailed analysis. But I also say, at the same time, that what is being done against him is an abuse, absolutely illegal. The fact is that the prosecutor of the nation and the power of the nation will have the luxury of keeping him in prison, under “preventive detention”, for a period of three years. We have reached such a point of politicization of justice that you can go to jail and the judge can take three years to find out if you are guilty or not of any crime.
I believe there was a caricature coup and a real coup.
As happened in the dramatic situation that culminated with the coup d’état in Bolivia in 2019, the latest events in Peru have given rise to as many hypotheses and theories as there are analysts, experts and opinion makers in these generous South American lands. Roughly speaking, these competing interpretations (more than mere theories, decisive motives for political action -or inaction- are organized in three main groups. The first view is that of those who describe what happened as a self-coup perpetrated by Pedro Castillo, followed by the restoration of democratic normality with the assumption of the next person in the line of constitutional succession, the sworn-in president Dina Boluarte. There were even those who dared to compare Castillo to Fujimori.
A second group of interpretations points to the existence of “two coups”, interpreting as democratic interruptions both Pedro Castillo’s speech on December 7, as well as his dismissal by parliamentary means and the subsequent inauguration of Boluarte, considered here a de facto or illegitimate president. This theory is closely related to the one that spoke of “two conservativisms” and called for not taking sides in the decisive ballot that pitted Keiko Fujimori -daughter of the former dictator- against Peru Libre’s own candidate on June 8, 2021. Several “progressive” media echoed both hypotheses in Peru and in the world.
The third interpretation underlines the existence of a single coup, consummated by parliamentary means with the vacancy achieved, after two unsuccessful attempts, against the now former president. A coup that, from this point of view, would follow a clear regional pattern, with antecedents such as the parliamentary coup against Fernando Lugo in Paraguay and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil.
Let us recapitulate the facts: was there a coup, perhaps two? Who perpetrated it?
The caricature coup belongs to Mr. Castillo.
I believe there was a caricature coup and a real coup. The caricature coup belongs to Mr. Castillo. So far he has not spoken of what happened, and no one can say for sure. But it is a merely anecdotal fact: that of a president who, without prior announcement, in front of the cameras of a national chain, reads a small paper with a trembling hand, ordering the gentlemen of the armed forces to close the Congress in order to form an emergency government and reorganize the powers of the State.
In the first place it must be said that the closing of Congress is a national demand: except for the congressmen themselves, everyone demands it. The declaration, in this sense, fulfilled a widespread demand. The same goes for the highly corrupt judiciary: in my opinion, it should not only be reorganized, but totally dismantled. But the naïve and childish way in which he announced these measures is a mystery to me. Then one has to wonder what happened, how he decided it, why, and with whose participation and incidence.
“The closing of Congress is a national demand: except for the congressmen themselves, everyone is demanding it.”
But all this is nothing more than an anecdote that disorients, that distracts us from the central fact. This was not a coup d’état. The coup d’état came later, when, violating all the norms, the Congress removed him from office in a matter of minutes. A few hours later you had Castillo in prison, and Mrs. Dina Boluarte, apparently prepared for the occasion, assuming the presidency of the Republic. In a short time Boluarte declared a national emergency, refused to dialogue, and began to govern the country in a practically dictatorial manner, because constitutional guarantees were interrupted throughout the country. At this moment any policeman can break the door of my house and enter it without explanation: all Peruvian men and women are now in the same situation.
And what do you think about the presumed participation of two key actors: the Peruvian armed forces and the OAS, which in the figure of its Secretary General Luis Almagro had a very opportune visit to the country a few weeks before the coup?
Today everything is possible. Everything is imaginable. I would not yet risk any hypothesis. The newspaper La República published an article stating that Castillo, together with the last appointed Minister of Defense, General [Emilio] Bobbio, asked the General Commander of the Army for his resignation the day before the coup. According to that newspaper, after a meeting of all the commanders of the Joint Command, which included not only the Army but also the Navy and the Air Force, the uniformed officers agreed to reject the President’s request, deciding there and then to dismiss him. Although it does not expressly say so, the newspaper suggests that we would be in the presence of a coup defined by military actors.
Now, what does the OAS have to do in this matter? The curious thing is that, at least publicly and as far as we know, the OAS has defended Castillo, because he did not affect in any way the interests of the United States. When Castillo went to the Summit of the Americas he spoke of an “America for the Americans”, repeating James Monroe’s famous phrase. There was a clear message there. And when the OAS mission was in Peru, it was more critical of the opposition than of Castillo himself. With the information we have, I find it difficult to suppose that the OAS was the promoter of this. I still think -and of course I could be wrong, that this is mainly a local event, led by local actors, mobilized by local interests.
It is obvious that our cavernous right wing and certain military groups hate Castillo because they reject their own people. Some military chief leaked information stating that as long as there are armed forces in Peru, the left will not govern the country. The problem then is no longer only communism, as they used to say: now it is the entire left that is rejected by these people.
If Boluarte does not leave power she will lead the country to a tragedy.
Boluarte’s inauguration has been strongly resisted, both by the citizens of deep Peru and by different presidents and leaders of the region. Today we see attempts of mobilization with notable peaks of massiveness and radicalism. There are even dozens of fatal victims of repression. Where can this situation evolve in the coming weeks? Will the protests reach a destitutive climax? What immediate or mediate solution do you imagine for the crisis?
Today we are witnessing a comedy, a bad comedy, in which the press, including a so-called “progressive” press, is full of furious attacks against Mexico, Honduras, Bolivia or Argentina. Even against the OAS, arguing that today the whole world is against Peru. This is true with respect to the international level and the denunciations of the Boluarte government.
Regarding the popular response, we have to differentiate things here: it is not a question of the people in general, although they are very active and significant sectors. The popular classes, in general, are watching with more or less indifference what is happening, as usual. They are disengaged from the political world and from all these events. But the mobilized sectors, it is clear, are not going to ignore the state of emergency and will continue to protest. I find it hard to believe that Mrs. Boluarte does not know that the continuity of these measures will bring more deaths and more blood. And I find it hard to imagine how she could appoint such a right-wing cabinet, linked to the financial oligarchy of [Pedro Pablo] Kuczynski, without any political capacity or willingness to dialogue.
If Boluarte does not leave power she will lead the country to a tragedy. What she and her circle hope is that the people will get tired and demobilize, that they will forget their problems, and continue in this way for at least two more years of government. But there is no historical experience that supports this strategy in Peru.
The Left’s misdirection
Rare are the occasions in which a text written 60 years ago can still illuminate the present of a country. It is the case of the book “Peru 1965: notes on a guerrilla experience”, written in the prison of El Frontón Island between 1966 and 1969 by Béjar himself, when he was part of the ELN. He said there:
” […] due to the insufficiency and lack of continuity of theoretical work, the Peruvian left as a whole cannot exhibit an interpretation of the Peruvian reality based on serious studies […] Part of that ballast is the one we have received and the one that still prevents us from seeing social changes with complete clarity”.
What has become of the Peruvian left in the last decades? Why was it unable to read with complete clarity the latest social changes, from the unexpected electoral possibilities of Pedro Castillo to this popular insurrection at the door? Béjar assures us that the social structure of the country has been radically transformed in recent times. But perhaps the many “Peruvians in Peru” continue to determine the many lefts -rural and urban, Lima or provincial- that inhabit the popular camp. To these insoluble problems must be added, in addition, the presence of a hysterical right wing that “terruquea” -accuses as terrorist or communist- anyone who expresses any demands or even the slightest disagreement.
What is the current state of the Peruvian social movement, independently of what is happening at the governmental level? How is it coming out of this trance, of the brief interregnum of the Castillo government?
The social movement has grown a lot. In Peru there is a political left, which is in the political apparatus, in the political system, and there is what we could call a “social left”, which is not left in terms of strict political consciousness, but which has many social activists who feel they belong to the left, have highly articulated political ideas and are highly honest people. There are thousands of them in contemporary Peru. In that sense, the social movement has grown a lot. But we cannot sanctify these processes. Corruption permeates everything in this country, including sectors of the social movement.
But the truth is that the social movement is stronger and more active than it was a few decades ago: we see it today, in its great capacity for mobilization, in its possibility of influencing the government. This movement does not wait for slogans from political parties: it is capable of reacting positively and spontaneously.
Plurinationality in Peru
You mentioned, in a recent interview, that there was a positivist left in Peru, which thought in terms of civilization and barbarism. At the same time, there has been much discussion about the apparent non-existence of an indigenous movement, at least comparable to its counterparts in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador or Guatemala. What is the state of the debate on plurinationality in Peru? Does it seem to you a possible and reasonable perspective to reorganize the State? What is the situation of the indigenous and peasant-indigenous movement?
There are demands and statements about plurinationality, but we have not yet had a serious discussion about it.
In Peru’s social panorama, which is quite complex and varied, we can establish various indigenist tonalities and positions. The strongest and most conscious indigenous movements -or their indigenism, depending on the perspective- are the native peoples of the Peruvian Amazon, who recognize themselves as communities with their own identity. This is the case of the Ashaninka and Aguaruna, for example. These and other peoples speak around 200 languages, and some of them cover an important expanse of the national territory, from the central Amazon to the south of Peru.
The other strong pole, with a strong presence and identity, is the Aymara, in the altiplano near Bolivia, in a border that is only political and where cultural exchange is very strong. With the Quechua the situation is different. Peru was the center of Spanish colonialism in South America. The Quechuas were subjugated, but they established some form of identification with the colonial regime and had their own chiefs and curacas for 300 years. The well known exception was that of Tupac Amaru and his revolution. But this did not happen with the rest of the aristrocracies of the Quechua elites, who were rather instrumentalized by the colonizers.
Then there are other nationalities, which have disappeared or are less visible. The vortex of the current rebellion is in the territory of the Charcas, in the Apurimac area, in the central-southern departments of Peru. These people have always been very resistant. They have their own tradition, although they do not recognize themselves as a people, but rather as Apurimeños or Abancaínos and also as Peruvians. Then we have the people from the north, from Cajamarca, from the land of Castillo: more acculturated people, more influenced by the Spaniards of the Colony.
The situation in sum is quite varied, and presents the serious possibility of building a plurinational state.
We do not yet know how it might work, nor which nationalities would eventually be recognized. But there is a demand, and it is even accepted by certain cultural elites, for a new Constitution that could include a plurinational and multicultural panorama, although there is also active opposition from sectors of the most cavernous right wing.
It would seem then that the indigenous question and the peasant question appear to be closely linked to the regional question, and above all to the political and administrative centralization in Lima, excessive even in a continent where centralization around the port-cities is a very exacerbated phenomenon.
Yes, Lima is absolutely dominant. But Lima is also provincial. People from all over Peru are also there.
Finally, how do you see the country in its regional context?
I always believed that the best way to wage the struggle is continentally. Intensifying regional ties is now much easier; technology gives us all the facilities to do so. It is a pity that we do not have Latin American publishing houses as we had many years ago. We have media such as Telesur, a very important example, but perhaps we can do something more in terms of communication. Other political forces in the continent have had very important political achievements, which we still have not assimilated, while others, such as Peru’s, shine for their inefficiency. We must do everything possible to take the debate out of its daily political contingency. We have to have a political debate of greater depth, of longer duration, more continental and also more global.
Translation by Miguel S. for Internationalist 360°
INTERNATIONALIST 360° 