Impact of the Economic War on the People of Venezuela

Pascualina Curcio
“The United States is preparing new and significant sanctions against Venezuela” [1]. This is the headline in today’s press. The information was released by Elliot Abrams, Donald Trump’s special envoy for Venezuela.

Similar statements have been made by other White House spokespersons. Recently and in the same style of “making the economy scream” pronounced by Richard Nixon when referring to Chile at the beginning of 70´, William Brownfield said:

“If we are going to sanction PDVSA, it will have an impact on the entire people, on the ordinary citizen. The counter-argument is that the people suffer so much from the lack of food, security, medicines, public health, that at this moment perhaps the greatest resolution would be to accelerate the collapse even though it produces a period of suffering of months or perhaps years.

Since 1999, the Venezuelan people have been victims of systematic aggressions by U.S. governments. Remember the sabotage, in November 2002, against the country’s main industry, Petróleos de Venezuela. A company that generates 98% of the nation’s foreign currency income, and whose paralysis implied a loss of 16,000 million dollars for the Venezuelan economy[3].

Starting in 2013, after the death of President Hugo Chávez and the beginning of the first presidential term of Nicolás Maduro, the U.S. government resumed the aggressions against the Venezuelan people, which were covert, but with the passing of time are not only open and formal, but more intense.

These are economic aggressions that have not only been limited to unilateral coercive measures characterized mainly by financial and commercial blockades, but have also attacked our currency, the bolivar, inducing hyperinflation and destabilization of all sectors of the economy resulting in a significant contraction of national production and therefore affecting the Venezuelan population. This is an economic war[4].

The economic aggressions are part of a plan whose objective is to overthrow the constitutional, legitimate and democratically elected government in Venezuela through the generation of economic and political destabilization, accompanied by a discourse in which the Bolivarian government and its model are held accountable, which allows popular support to be undermined, as well as fracturing the Bolivarian National Armed Force that leads to a coup d’état.

This plan has been revealed in two documents signed by the Head of the U.S. Southern Command, Kurt Tidd. The first of them titled Venezuela Freedom-2 Operation” dated February 25, 2016[5], and the second “Golpe maestro para acabar con la ´dictadura´ de Venezuela” dated February 2018[6].

One reads in these documents:

“Intensify the definitive overthrow of Chavismo and the expulsion of its representative, undermine popular support… Continue hardening the condition within the armed forces to carry out a coup d’état…

…to encourage popular dissatisfaction by increasing the process of destabilization and shortages…to contribute to making the situation of the population more critical…

…Increase internal instability to critical levels, intensifying the decapitalization of the country, the flight of foreign capital and the deterioration of the national currency, through the application of new inflationary measures that increase that deterioration…Obstruct all imports and at the same time discourage potential foreign investors.”[7].

Within the framework of these plans, which require the support of the international community for subsequent entry into Venezuelan territory, the U.S. government proposes as a strategy the generation of a humanitarian crisis that justifies intervention through humanitarian aid.

Documents read:

“It is of special interest, in the current circumstances, to position the matrix that Venezuela is entering a stage of humanitarian crisis due to lack of food, water and medicines. We must continue to manage the scenario where Venezuela is “close to collapse and implosion” demanding from the international community a humanitarian intervention to maintain peace and save lives?

…Doctrinally, the state and its controlling policy must be held accountable as the cause of economic stagnation, inflation and scarcity.”[8]

We cannot fail to mention that the terrorist and criminal attack on the national electricity system perpetrated on March 7 that resulted in a blackout and left the entire Venezuelan population without electricity, water and communications for almost three days, putting the lives of Venezuelans at risk and violating their human rights, is part of these plans to generate chaos and destabilization.

We will focus this report on the impact of the economic aggressions on the Venezuelan people. We will consider unilateral coercive measures, i.e. financial and economic sanctions and blockades, as well as the attack on the currency. We also present the methodology for estimating the losses caused by these aggressions, as well as the source of the information.

Chronology of unilateral coercive measures against the Venezuelan people.

  • December 2014. The U.S. Congress approves Law 113-278: “Public Law for the Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society in Venezuela” which establishes the roadmap for U.S. policy towards Venezuela and for other states, under its influence, to adopt unilateral coercive measures against Venezuela.
  • March 2015. Barack Obama issues Executive Order 13692 declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.
  • March 2016. The U.S. administration renews Executive Order 13692 for one year.
  • May 2016. Commerzbank (Germany) closes accounts held by various institutions, Venezuelan public banks and Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA).
  • July 2016. The U.S. bank Citibank unilaterally ceases the service of correspondent accounts in foreign currency of Venezuelan institutions in the U.S., including those of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV).

Risk rating agencies place Venezuela with the highest financial risk in the world (2640 points), well above countries at war, despite having fulfilled its external debt commitments. Since 2013, Venezuela has paid 63.566 billion dollars, but this index increased 202% during the same period, from 768 in 2012 to 2323 in 2016[10]. Each 100 country risk points equals an additional 1% interest rate.

  • August 2016. Novo Banco (Portugal) reports the impossibility of carrying out operations in dollars with Venezuelan banks due to pressure exerted by correspondent banks of this institution.
  • September 2016. The Venezuelan government makes an offer to exchange 7.1 billion dollars in PDVSA bonds in order to alleviate the amortization schedule and partially refinance its obligations. The three big U.S. risk rating agencies frighten investors with default if they access the Venezuelan proposal.
  • November 2016. JP Morgan Bank issues a false default alert on an alleged PDVSA debt default of 404 million dollars.

The US oil company, Conoco Phillips, sues PDVSA before a court in Delaware, USA, for a bond swap. The objective of this legal action was to frighten the participants and thus cause the operation to fail.

  • December 2016. Crane Currency, a banknote supplier to the Treasury Department and contracted by the Venezuelan government to print the pieces of the monetary cone, delays the shipment of the new bills.
  • July 2017. Delaware Trust, PDVSA’s bond payment agent, reports that its correspondent bank (PNC Bank) in the United States refuses to receive funds from the Venezuelan oil company.

Citibank (USA) refuses to receive Venezuelan funds to import 300,000 doses of insulin.

The Treasury Department, through the Office for the Control of Foreign Assets (OFAC), dictates sanctions against a group of Venezuelan officials, including the President of the Republic, Nicolás Maduro Moros, one day after the election of the National Constituent Assembly.

  • August 2017. Swiss bank Credit Suisse prohibits its clients from making financial transactions with Venezuela.
  • October 2017. The US financial blockade makes it impossible for Venezuela to deposit in the Swiss bank UBS resources for vaccines and medicines acquired through the Pan American Health Organization’s Revolving and Strategic Fund, which generated a four-month delay in the acquisition of vaccines, altering the vaccination schemes in the country.
  • August 2017. Bank Of China (BOC – Panama), informs that due to instructions from the US Treasury Department and pressure from the Panamanian government, it will not be able to carry out any operation in foreign currency in favor of Venezuela.

Russian banks report the impossibility of making transactions to Venezuelan banks, due to the restriction imposed by correspondent banks in the U.S. and Europe, to Venezuelan operations.

The correspondent of the bank BDC Shandong, alleging administrative reasons, paralyzes a transaction for 200 million dollars towards Venezuela in spite of the fact that the funds had been transferred by the People’s Republic of China.

Donald Trump issues Executive Order 13808: “Imposition of sanctions with respect to the situation in Venezuela” which establishes the following prohibitions:

  • That the Venezuelan government acquire new debts with maturity greater than 30 days.
  • That PDVSA acquires new debt with a maturity greater than 90 days.
  • New shares obtained by the Venezuelan government.
  • Payment of dividends or distribution of profits to the Venezuelan government by companies operating in the U.S., which especially affects the CITGO refinery.

Euroclear, the company in charge of the safekeeping of part of Venezuela’s sovereign bonds, freezes securities liquidation operations, citing “revision” reasons. To date, Euroclear has retained 1.6 billion dollars without the possibility of mobilization.

  • September 2017. The Treasury Department, through its Financial Crimes Control Network (FINCEN), issues an alert called “red flags” that imposes a surveillance and control system on Venezuela’s financial transactions to prevent the payment of food and medicines.

A shipment of 300,000 doses of insulin paid for by the Venezuelan government does not reach the country because Citibank boycotted the purchase of this important item.

The disembarkation of 18 million boxes of subsidized food from the Local Supply and Prices Committee program is interrupted by obstacles imposed by the U.S. financial system.

Venezuela is included in the list of countries with a travel ban. The ban applies only to Venezuelan government officials.

  • October 2017. The refining company PBF Energy, the fifth largest U.S. importer of Venezuelan crude oil, suspends direct purchases from PDVSA.

Canada approves bill S-226 that authorizes it to impose restrictions on property transactions and freeze the assets of foreign officials.

U.S. oil company NuStar Energy prohibits PDVSA from using a storage terminal in the Caribbean.

Deutsche Bank informs Citic Bank of the People’s Republic of China of the closure of its correspondent accounts for processing PDVSA payments.

  • November 2017. Colombia blocks the dispatch of antimalarial treatment (primaquine and chloroquine) requested from the BSN Medical laboratory in that country.

The transnational pharmaceutical companies Baster, Abbot and Pfizer refuse to issue export certificates for oncological medicines, making it impossible for Venezuela to purchase them.

The U.S. sanctions and disqualifies Venezuelan officials who administer food supply programs, preventing them from signing trade agreements or international conventions that favor Venezuela’s food policy.

The European Union prohibits the sale of armaments and security equipment to Venezuela.

The Deutsche Bank, the main correspondent of the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV), closes the accounts definitively.

A total of 23 financial operations of Venezuela, destined to the purchase of food, basic inputs and medicines for 39 million dollars, are returned by international banks.

Standard and Poor’s declares Venezuela in “selective default”.

  • December 2017. Venezuelan payments of the cabotage service for the transport of fuel are blocked, which causes a shortage of this product in several states.

A total of 19 Venezuelan bank accounts abroad are arbitrarily closed by U.S. banks, preventing payments to creditors.

471,000 tires are held up abroad for vehicles purchased abroad whose payments were made.

  • January 2018. 11 Venezuelan and PDVSA debt bonds, worth 1,241 million dollars, could not be cancelled to their creditors due to the obstacle of sanctions.
  • February 2018. The U.S. Treasury Department extends financial sanctions to Venezuela and Venezuelan companies established in Executive Order 13808 of August 2017. It prevents the renegotiation or restructuring of Venezuelan and PDVSA debt, issued prior to August 25, 2017.

The Trump Administration:

Renews for one year executive order 13692

It renews executive order 13808 and imposes six new coercive measures that threaten Venezuela’s financial stability by prohibiting debt restructuring and preventing the repatriation of dividends from Citgo Petroleum, a Venezuelan state-owned company.
Executive Order 13827 prohibits any citizen or institution from carrying out financial transactions with the Venezuelan crypto currency “Petro”.

The Government of Panama publishes a list of 55 sanctioned Venezuelan citizens (including President Nicolás Maduro) and 16 Venezuelan companies considered “high risk”.

  • April 2018. Chancellor of Peru, in the framework of the Summit of the Americas, and on behalf of the Lima Group, announces that they have decided to create a follow-up group to study political and economic measures against Venezuela. At the same Summit, the U.S. and Colombia agree to accelerate mechanisms to pursue Venezuela’s financial transactions and hinder the commodity supply lines required by the country.
  • May 2018. May 2018. Claiming a favourable ruling of an arbitration award for 2,000 40 million dollars before the International Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. oil company Conoco Phillips announces that it will seize PDVSA’s international assets.

They block the payment of 9 million dollars destined to the acquisition of inputs for dialysis, for the treatment of 15 thousand hemodialysis patients.

The Colombian government blocks the shipment to Venezuela of 400,000 kilos of food from the food subsidy program of the Local Supply and Production Committees (CLAP).

In retaliation for the 2019-2025 presidential election, in which more than 9 million citizens voted and Nicolás Maduro won with 67% of the votes, Donald Trump issued Executive Order 13835 in which he extended economic sanctions against Venezuela and banned the purchase of debt and accounts payable from Venezuelan government companies.

The U.S. sanctions 20 Venezuelan companies for alleged links with drug trafficking.

  • August 2018. The U.S. authorizes Crystallex to confiscate assets of Citgo Petroleum, owned by PDVSA.

The Brazilian government stopped paying 40 million dollars owed to the Corporación Eléctrica de Venezuela for supplying energy to the state of Roraima. Brazil’s foreign minister, Aloysio Nunes, declared that the electricity debt “has not been cancelled because of the economic and financial blockade imposed by the United States and the European Union against Venezuela.

  • November 2018. Donald Trump prohibits U.S. citizens from trading in gold exported from the South American country.[11]
  • January 2019. Donald Trump’s administration approves new sanctions against Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), which includes the freezing of 7 billion dollars in assets of the subsidiary CITGO, in addition to an estimated loss of 11 billion dollars from its exports over the next few years.[12].

How They Attacked the Currency

Parallel to the application of coercive measures, blockades, sanctions and appropriation of assets, imperialism has been attacking the national currency, the Bolivar, with the objective of inducing inflation and affecting national production levels. It does so through the daily manipulation of the exchange rate through web portals whose domains reside in U.S. territory, specifically Miami.

By manipulating the exchange rate and quoting it at a value greater than the official value, they affect the prices of all imported goods, which in turn are required for production processes. The increase in the prices of imported products raises all production costs and therefore the prices of final goods. It is what is known as a supply shock that manifests itself in stagflation, i.e. price increase (inflation) with economic stagnation or recession.

Historically, increases in the exchange rate in Venezuela have led to increases in the internal prices of the economy, what happens is that from 2013, this exchange rate has been manipulated politically through web portals that reside in the U.S. (see graph 1).This aggression against the Venezuelan economy, and therefore against the people as a whole, has three effects: 1) it deteriorates real wages; 2) it contracts production levels; 3) it makes public spending and investment insufficient.

From 2013 to date, the exchange rate has been manipulated by 3500 million percent. In 2013 it was quoted at 8.69 BsF/US$ and today it is published at 350,000,000 BsF/US$ (see graph 2).

Nothing has happened in the Venezuelan economy to explain this supposed depreciation of the currency in such magnitudes. It has been a manipulation of the exchange rate that attends to a pattern of political behavior associated with moments of high conflict or electoral processes (graph 3).

We have estimated the losses caused by the attack on the currency on the levels of national production which, added to those caused by the blockade, the sanctions and the illegal appropriation of our assets, show the criminal magnitude of the unilateral coercive measures taken by imperialism against the Venezuelan people.

Impact of the economic war against the Venezuelan people

The losses caused by unilateral coercive measures imposed by the United States on the Venezuelan people from 2013 to date, including the attack on the national currency, amount to 114,302 million dollars.

Of these 114,302 million, 21,450 million losses have been caused by unilateral coercive measures, financial blockades, commercial embargoes, the theft of CITGO assets, the resources that are not perceived by such an act of pillage, the gold retained in England and the euros blocked in Euroclear.

The difference, i.e. 92,852 million dollars, corresponds to what we have ceased to produce as a result of the attack on the currency, which, in addition to inducing inflation, also reduces national production levels.

Impact of unilateral coercive measures

In a scenario of very conservative estimation, losses caused by unilateral coercive measures amount to $21.45 billion to date. This includes:

1) 11,000 million dollars in losses that will not be perceived due to the illegal appropriation of the Venezuelan oil company CITGO by the US.

2) 7 billion dollars for the illegal appropriation of CITGO’s assets.

3) 1.6 billion dollars retained by Euroclear.

4) 1200 million dollars equivalent to the gold retained by the Bank of England[14].

5) 467 million dollars for the decrease in the value of securities held in custody in Euroclear, which went from USD 1,093,529,941.96 to 625.90MM, a decrease of 57.24% as a result of the financial blockade[15].

7) 37 million dollars[16] due to operational obstacles imposed by shipping companies and international ports, such as the shift of cargo destined for Venezuela and the increase in waiting times, together with the increase in tariffs[17].

8) 655 thousand dollars for transfers, payment consultations, transfer amendments, between operating costs. Before the U.S. sanctions were applied, payment instructions were sent through correspondent banks and executed within 48 hours. Now, on average, a payment is made between 10 and 20 continuous days[18].

9) 20 million dollars for the exchange rate differential, since the Republic is forced to adopt currencies other than the U.S. dollar in order to carry out financial and commercial transactions[19].

10) 264 million dollars for the loss of the bond acquired through Credit Suisse corresponding to the external public debt[20].

These are conservative estimates because they do not include, for example, losses caused by the decomposition of food or medicine retained longer than expected on the ships, or the additional cost of transportation and administrative procedures caused by the need to triangulate purchases in order to avoid sanctions against companies or countries by the United States.

Impact of the attack on the currency

Among the economic aggressions we cannot fail to consider the attack on the currency by the effects on the Venezuelan people, which are not only limited to the deterioration of real wages as a result of the hyperinflation induced by said attack, but also has a contraction effect on national production and therefore on national consumption. This attack comes from web pages whose domain resides in the U.S., specifically the web portal Dolartoday.

Historically, national production in Venezuela has been determined at 96.6% by the levels of oil exports, during the last 4 years, and particularly since 2016 the sale of oil has only affected 60% of the gross domestic product, the other 40% is influenced by the supply shock resulting from the attack on the currency. In other words, the fall in the gross domestic product that we have recorded since 2016 is due in 60% to the fall in oil exports and in 40% to the attack on the currency[21].

For this reason, despite the recovery of oil exports in 2017 and 2018[22], mainly due to the increase in the price of hydrocarbons, the gross domestic product did not recover, but maintained its downward trend (see Graph 4). Under normal conditions, i.e. had there been no political manipulation of the exchange rate, a recovery in GDP would have been expected as exports increased. This was not the case in 2017 and 2018.

In a conservative scenario, assuming normal conditions, no economic war, no attacks on the Bolivar, with an average price of US$ 45 per barrel of oil, and oil export levels of around US$ 37 billion[23], which in turn implies assuming that there would not have been sabotage in the oil industry[24] and that hydrocarbon production levels would have remained similar to 2015, i.e. 2.9 million barrels per day, the gross domestic product should have been around US$ 131 billion, equivalent to that of 2015.

When calculating the annual difference of the expected annual gross domestic product, that is, that of 2015[25], with what was actually produced in 2016, 2017 and 2018, it is obtained that, in total, during those three years, US$92,852 million were not produced.

Of this estimated loss of US$92.852 billion, which includes the effects of the attack on the currency and the silent boycott of the oil industry, US$41.691 billion corresponds to the attack on the currency.

Adding the losses caused by unilateral coercive measures and those related to national production levels due to the attack on the currency and the boycott of oil production results in a total loss of 113,652 million dollars.

Of that estimated loss of US$ 92.852 million, which includes the effects of the attack on the currency and the silent boycott of the oil industry, US$ 41.691 million corresponds to the attack on the currency.

Adding the losses caused by unilateral coercive measures and those related to national production levels due to the attack on the currency and the boycott of oil production, this results in a total loss of 113,652 million dollars.

Impact of the Economic War on the Venezuelan People

For the size of the Venezuelan economy, this figure represents a little less than the national production of a whole year with a price of US$ 45 a barrel of oil. The gross domestic product for 2015 was US$131,626 million[26].

This US$114.302 billion is also equivalent to importing medicines and food to supply the 30 million Venezuelans for 26 years. For example, in 2004, when there was no shortage of food, imports, including raw materials for production, were US$2.16 billion[27]. In the case of medicines, imports amounted to US$2.259 billion[28]. In other words, US$4.3 billion a year covers imports and supplies the entire population with inputs, raw materials and final products for food and medicine.

The losses to date caused by the sanctions, the blockade and the attack on the currency coincide with the investment in health for 10 years, taking into account that this represents around 10% of the annual gross domestic product. In other words, they are equivalent to the guarantee of providing hospital, ambulatory and preventive health services, both in the public and private sectors, to all Venezuelans for 10 years.

They represent the guarantee of the right to education for 10 years, both public and private, from preschool to university. Investment in education represents 10% of the annual gross domestic product.

These losses represent total annual imports for 7.5 years, including machinery, spare parts, transportation, raw materials, inputs, food and medicine, textiles, chemical industry products, etc. For example, in 2004, when there was no shortage, annual imports amounted to US$15.161 billion[29].

They correspond to the Republic’s total external debt, which we must repay over a period of 20 years.

For us to have other references and to be able to recognize the magnitude of the criminal and genocidal attack suffered by the Venezuelan people, we offer other indicators[30]:

  • With the 1.2 billion dollars that England has withheld from us in gold, food is purchased for 6 million households for 6 months.
  • Only 20 million dollars covers care and treatment for 3 years to all people with malaria.
  • Forty million dollars will provide antiretroviral treatment for people with HIV and AIDS for two years.
  • With 18 million dollars we procure 9 million doses of vaccines to implement the annual vaccination plan[31].
  • With $11 billion in losses from the looting against CITGO, we imported all medicines and medical and surgical supplies including inputs for internal production for 5 years[32].

Each number presented here corresponds to the face of a Venezuelan woman, man, boy or girl. It is not only about the economic impact on imports or production, it is about the impact that these economic aggressions have on the guarantee of the human rights of each Venezuelan.

These aggressions affect in a massive and systematic way the entire population, both civil and military.

However, we must point out that Venezuela is not in a situation of humanitarian crisis. Without ignoring the difficulties for the acquisition of food and medicines that these aggressions have caused, in the country routine work, educational and recreational activities are carried out normally.

In spite of the criminal attack against the Venezuelan people, in the last 6 years more than 2.5 million houses have been built, not a single hospital or school has been closed, food and medicine companies continue to operate in our territory.

Venezuela continues to occupy first place as the least unequal country in Latin America according to ECLAC figures.

These are indicators that show that despite the difficulties caused by the economic war, Venezuela is not in a situation of humanitarian crisis and therefore does not require humanitarian aid.

We Venezuelans demand that the aggressions cease, that the sanctions and the blockade be lifted and that the attack on our currency be stopped.

Economic War: Crime Against Humanity

Financially and economically blocking a country, causing a trade embargo, withholding its currency, appropriating its assets and attacking its currency not only violate all international norms, but also constitute crimes against humanity according to the definition given by the Rome Statute.

Alfred de Zayas, an independent expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order of the UN, visited Venezuela in November 2017, met with all sectors of society and prepared a report in which he stated that “[t]he solution to the Venezuelan “crisis” lies in good faith negotiations between the government and the opposition, the end of the economic war and the lifting of sanctions”.

De Zayas suggested that States Parties to the Rome Statute “recognize geopolitical crimes, including unilateral coercive measures and monetary manipulations that induce hyperinflation, as crimes against humanity”[34]. He argues that “economic warfare, embargoes, financial blockades and sanctions regimes amount to geopolitical crimes and crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court” [35] for being committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population and with knowledge of such an attack.

These economic aggressions that imperialism has put into practice every time it feels threatened with the possibility of consolidating a model of social justice, of equality, that guarantees human rights to all the population, transcend Venezuelan borders in time and space. It happened with Salvador Allende’s socialist project in Chile between 1970 and 1973, or that of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in the 1980s, or in Cuba from the 1960s to the present day.

Allende said it in his speech to the UN Assembly on December 4, 1972, in which he denounced that his country was being attacked, a speech that, by the way, few believed:

“The spokesman for the African Group stated that his Group was in full solidarity with Chile because it was not an issue that affected only one nation, but potentially the entire developing world. Those words have great value, because they signify the recognition of an entire Continent, that through the Chilean case a new stage in the battle between imperialism and the weak countries of the Third World has been raised.”(our emphasis)

It is time that these coercive actions of imperialism are not only revealed and denounced before the world, but also recognized as crimes against humanity.

Venezuelans do not need humanitarian aid, what we demand is justice to prevent impunity for statements like those offered by the spokesman of the U.S. State Department who said when addressing the effectiveness of unilateral coercive measures:

“The pressure campaign against Venezuela is working. The financial sanctions we have imposed (…) have forced the government to start falling into default on both the sovereign debt and the debt of PDVSA, its oil company. And what we are seeing (…) is a total economic collapse in Venezuela. Then our policy works, our strategy works and we will maintain it”[36].

To recognize unilateral coercive measures and the attack on the currency as crimes against humanity would be an important step for stability and world peace.

In this respect, the UN has had a great debt for decades.

Report prepared at the request of FUNDALATIN


[1] Rusia Today. Estados Unidos prepara nuevas y significativas sanciones contra Venezuela. 12 de marzo de 2019.



[4] Las armas no convencionales de la Guerra económica en Venezuela pueden consultarse en Curcio, Pasqualina. La mano visible del mercado. Guerra económica en Venezuela. Editorial Nosotros Mismos. 3era edición. 2018. Caracas. Venezuela.

[5] Kurt Tidd. Venezuela Freedom-2 Operation. 2016.

[6] Kurt Tidd. Golpe maestro para acabar con la ´dictadura´ de Venezuela”. 2018.

[7] Kurt Tidd. Golpe maestro para acabar con la ´dictadura´ de Venezuela”. 2018.

[8] Kurt Tidd. Venezuela Freedom-2 Operation. 2016.

[9] Tomada de: Ministerio del poder popular para las Relaciones Exteriores. “Sanciones y bloqueo. Crimen de lesa humanidad contra Venezuela”. Septiembre 2018.

[10] Curcio, Pasqualina. La mano visible del mercado. Guerra económica en Venezuela. Editorial Nosotros Mismos. Caracas. Venezuela. 2016.



[13] Los análisis y cálculos detallados relacionados con el ataque a la moneda como arma imperial pueden ser consultados en Curcio, Pasqualina. Hiperinflación. Arma imperial. Editorial Nosotros mismos. 2018, Caracas. Venezuela.


[15] Ministerio del poder popular para las Relaciones Exteriores. “Sanciones y bloqueo. Crimen de lesa humanidad contra Venezuela”. Septiembre 2018.

[16] Esta cifra corresponde al promedio de espera de los buques, que aumentó en un 33,33% pasando de 45 días en el año 2017 a 60 días en el año 2018. A los costos por días de demora, que han aumentado 51,52%, pasando de USD. 16.500 a USD. 25.000 en el caso de buques a granel, resumiéndose en un costo adicional respecto al año 2017 de USD. 26,65MM. En el caso de los buques por contenedores, sus costos asociados aumentaron en promedio un 40,63% desde USD. 3.200 a USD. 4.500, resumiéndose en un costo adicional respecto al año 2017 de USD. 10,40MM. (Tomado del informe del Ministerio del poder popular para las Relacione Exteriores. “Sanciones y bloqueo. Crimen de lesa humanidad contra Venezuela”. Septiembre 2018.

[17] Ministerio del poder popular para las Relaciones Exteriores. “Sanciones y bloqueo. Crimen de lesa humanidad contra Venezuela”. Septiembre 2018.

[18] Ministerio del poder popular para las Relaciones Exteriores. “Sanciones y bloqueo. Crimen de lesa humanidad contra Venezuela”. Septiembre 2018.

[19] Ministerio del poder popular para las Relaciones Exteriores. “Sanciones y bloqueo. Crimen de lesa humanidad contra Venezuela”. Septiembre 2018.

[20] Ministerio del poder popular para las Relaciones Exteriores. “Sanciones y bloqueo. Crimen de lesa humanidad contra Venezuela”. Septiembre 2018.

[21] En Curcio, Pasqualina (2018). Hiperinflación. Arma Imperial, Editorial Nosotros Mismos, se presentan los cálculos, metodologías y modelos econométricos que sustentan esta afirmación.

[22] Los niveles del PIB se expresan en US$ y a precios constantes. Para evitar distorsiones en cuanto el tipo de cambio, se procedió a calcular las variaciones del PIB desde el año 2003, en el cual la brecha entre los tipos de cambio oficial y paralelo era mínimo. Las variaciones interanuales fueron tomadas del Banco Central de Venezuela hasta el año 2015, a partir de esa fecha y hasta el 2017 la fuente son los informes de la OPEP. Para el año 2018 se supuso una caída del 10%. En todo caso, cualquier magnitud de caída contrasta con el aumento de las exportaciones petroleras.

[23] Similares a las exportaciones del año 2015, lo que supone iguales niveles de producción petrolera que los registrados ese año, es decir, 2,9 millones de barriles diarios.


[25] A pesar de que durante ese año y desde el 2012 ha habido un ataque a la moneda, dicha manipulación fue relativamente muy baja con respecto a la que se comenzó a registrar de 2016 en adelante. Por tal motivo, consideramos que es un buen año de referencia en el cual el precio promedio del barril de petróleo se ubicó en US$ 44,65.

[26] Expresado en dólares corrientes. Fuente: Banco Central de Venezuela.

[27] Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. Secciones I a la IV.

[28] Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. Sección VI.

[29] Instituto Nacional de Estadística.

[30] Intervención ofrecida por el presidente de la Comisión de DDHH, Larry Devoe, ante la CIDH.

[31] Ministerio del poder popular para la Salud. Lista de precios referenciales por vacuna de la Organización Panamericana de la Salud.

[32] Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. Sección VI.

[33] Organización para las Naciones Unidas. Consejo de Derechos Informe del Experto Independiente sobre la promoción de un orden internacional democrático y equitativo en su visita a la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y la República del Ecuador, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas. 2018.

[34] Organización para las Naciones Unidas. Consejo de Derechos Informe del Experto Independiente sobre la promoción de un orden internacional democrático y equitativo en su visita a la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y la República del Ecuador, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas. 2018.

[35] Organización para las Naciones Unidas. Consejo de Derechos Informe del Experto Independiente sobre la promoción de un orden internacional democrático y equitativo en su visita a la República Bolivariana de Venezuela y la República del Ecuador, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas. 2018.

[36] Ministerio del poder popular para las Relaciones Exteriores. “Sanciones y bloqueo. Crimen de lesa humanidad contra Venezuela”. Septiembre 2018.

Translation by Internationalist 360°